Airbus problems
A very experienced Airbus pilot writes:
I have flown the AB330-300 in Intl. ops. For several thousand hrs. as well as, like most of you, multi thousands in Boeings.
With all that, here's what I see through my "caveman" point of view: Airbus philosophy has left the art of flying and therefore the pilot out of the loop. They train and design the operation so that any low experienced/low skilled person who is good at rote memory (read third world/read and do) pilot can get into this plane, with enough repetition and rehearsal; fly a normal trip.
FATAL FLAW #1 -- The engines are computer/electronically controlled and the flight controls are controlled by radio signals. THERE IS NO DIRECT CONTROL FROM THE PILOT TO THESE CRITICAL SYSTEMS. Following in this philosophy, the pilot training strictly emphasizes Always to be in the Automated mode - read auto throttles and auto pilot - in all operations even including a single engine failure approach and single engine missed approach! - I.e. AUTO FLT; ALL THE TIME.
Nowhere is there any contingency, training or flight manual information data for a pilot to take over manually and fly attitude and power settings for a certain configuration in the event that these auto systems fail. NOR are there any MANUAL, direct link controls to the engines/flt controls from the cockpit.
FATAL FLAW #2 -- Airbus has incorporated composite materials into critical structural components in order to produce a lighter plane with less fuel burn.
Example 1: The Airbus 330 has no wing spar from the point where the engine mounts to the wing all the way to the wing tip! Over time, how can a wing NOT snap off?!
Example 2: the Airbus 300-600 that AMR crashed at JFK has a honeycomb composite rudder with no spar in it. This failed on this Airbus aircraft.
In summary: The pendulum of commercial aircraft design has swung way past the point of prudent/safe design. The momentum for this swing is found in the fact that "bean counters" and "bottom liners" backed by political forces have high jacked the construction and certification process of our commercial fleets to the point of producing unsafe passenger transports.
My comment:
Another serious fault with the Airbus construction is that it is impossible to extend spoilers manually. They are supposed to extend automatically when the wheels spin up after landing. Many accidents have occurred when landing in tail wind on very wet runways causing aqua planning.
Already in the nineteen nineties some very experienced captains reported to IATA about these serious risks with the Airbus, but for political reasons that report was stopped and put into file 13.
